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The Kentucky Civil Code Committees action in revising our
present code procedure is an earnest and laborious effort to streamline
our law by the elimination of outdated and useless code provisions
plus the consolidation and clarification of others. The committee has
chosen the brief, but very effective, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as its guide. The purpose of this note is to point out some of the
problems which will be confronted by the Committee in its effort to
fornmlate a workable Joinder of claims provision.
Prior to entering into a detailed discussion of the specific provision
it is appropriate to review briefly the history of the joinder of claims
rule. Under the common law system of pleading, unity of the subject
matter in a suit was secured by the writ system and by the forms of
action.i The plaintiff could combine in the same declaration any num-
ber of counts m the form of action selected, each stating a different
cause of action against the defendant. However, claims which did not
fall within the scope of the one form of action could not be joined,
even though the facts upon which they were based were identical.2
There were two notable exceptions to the general common law rule
that two or more forms of action could not be joined in one declara-
tion; debt and detinue, originally one action, could be joined; and
trover which developed from case, might be joined with it.3 It is
difficult to rationalize the common law rules on joinder, for the com-
monly accepted belief is that the rules were arbitrary because they
imposed limitations upon joinder without any reference to trial con-
veniences.4 For example, because of the restrictive concept of cause
of action a count in trespass could not be joined with a count in case,r5
although the two counts may have been only variations in presenting
underlying operative facts, and should have been regarded as different
statements of the same cause of action. On the other hand, wholly
unrelated trespasses could be pleaded in different counts in the same
action because they came under the same form of action. 6 Situations
such as this gave rise to the popular belief that there was no reason
for the above mentioned exceptions to be allowed and at The same
time refused to allow the joinder of trespass and case when it was
often only a matter of a different story of the same claim. The com-
'CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 435 (2 ed. 1947).
Ibid. at 436.
1 Cmr=r, PLEADING 206 (16th Am. Ed. 1879).
SHMiAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING, 201, 203 (3rd. ed. Ballantine 1923).
'Supra, note 1, at 436 fn. 4.
2 MooRE s FEDERAL PRAcTccE, 2113 (1938).
Sim' N, CO.MON LA.-W PLEADING, 203 (1923).
Supra, note 6, at 202,
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mon law penalty for misjoinder was extremely harsh in comparison
with our present day procedure and the defect could have been
reached by general demurrer, motion in arrest of judgment, and writ
of error.7
In equity the procedure resembled that which exists m those juris-
dictions which have adopted the code system. The purpose of the
common law rules regarding joinder was to avoid a multiplicity of
issues, whereas, equity "abhors a multiplicity of suits" Equity, desiring
to. settle the entire controversy between the parties at one time al-
lowed the contestants to introduce all closely related matters. What
could or could not be joined was within the discretion of the court,
and the criteria upon which it was determined was trial conveience.
The joinder rule, in equity was a broad one often referred to as the
"rule against multifariousness" 8 The equity objection of multifarious-
ness was recognized as being one which a court of equity could make
at any time on its own mitative. Equity proceeded upon the theory
that joinder was a trial problem and determination of the question as
to what should be joined could better be decided at the trial. In all
classes of cases, where the causes joined present common questions
of law or fact, the courts of equity are inclined to enforce the doctrine
of condemning the unnecessary use of separate suits, and the de-
fendant must make a very clear showing of prejudice before a de-
murrer for multifariousness will be sustained.
The procedural reform movement of America, which began with
the New York Code of 1848, swept away the common law forms of
action, and adopted in their place a single form of proceeding. When
the forms were discarded, the common law rules of joinder should have
been discarded with them, "But the framers of the code were still
unable to free themselves from the common law tradition that the
formal test of some kind must be adopted for restricting joinder of
causes of action."9 Section 88 of the present code of Kentucky which
was adopted by the legislature in 1876 provides in effect that:
Several causes of action may be united in the same complaint by
the plaintiff if all of them can be brought
(1) Upon express or implied contracts; or,
(2) For the recovery of real property and the rents, profits and
damages for withholding it; or,
(8) For the recovery of specific personal property, and damages
for the taking or withholding it; or,
'1 CMrTY, PLEADING 228 (16th Am. ed. 1879).
' Supra, note 1, at 437.
'Sunderland, Joider of Actions, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 571 at 579.
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(4) For the partition of real or personal property, or, both; or,
(5) For injuries to character; or,
(6) For injuries to person and property
But the causes of action, so united, must belong to one only of
these classes and must equally affect all the parties to the action and
not require different places of trial.10
Taking into account this code provision, it is difficult to see any
improvement over the common law system. The rigid and exact
'formal test of the common law procedure was replaced by an equally
exacting formal test. As can be seen no discretion was given to the
court to control the number of actions of any class which could be
joined, and no provision was made for consolidation.
The Kentucky Code provision is similar to the original New York
Code of 1848," which stated classes of suits - seven in number - of
similar forms of claims, and provided that joinder might be had within
these classes. There has been much discussion over the original pur-
pose of this method of categorizing by the original framers of the code.
The method followed is somewhat similar to that of the common law
since sunilarity of legal claim seems particularly to have been looked
for. It is to be noted however, that the code definitely has abolished
the old common law forms. Therefore, the classes are in some respects
less restricted than at common law, and in others more so. The com-
mon law action on the case, for example, allows joinder of claims which
now fall within several classes of the code.
The majority of the code states have adopted the famous "same
transaction" provision which was accepted in New York as a supple-
ment to its original code in 1852. This noted provision was added
directly from the equity practice, so that causes of action "arising out
of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject
of action,""3 might be joined. The original Kentucky Code of Civil
Practice which was adopted by the Legislature in 1851 did not contain
this provision, and the framers of the present code failed to include it,
nor has it been included by any subsequent amendments. The in-
clusion of this provision within the joinder of claims rule appears to
have introduced an illogical combination of joinder classes. The net
result of such a provision is to have some of the classes based upon
similarity of legal clamis, as it exists in Kentucky and some upon unity
of occurrence as it has existed to the present time in most of the codes.' 4
"Ky. CODE, Cin. PRAc. ANN. sec. 83 (Carroll's 1948).
" N.Y. Laws 1848, c. 379, see. 143.
"N.Y. Laws, 1852, c. 392, sec. 167.
" Ibid.
" Supra, note 1 at 441,
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The "same transaction" class may upset every other distinction in the
classification, since it cuts across all other classes.' 5
The primary limitations which have been umposed by Kentucky s
jomder of actions provision where there is only one plaintiff and one
defendant are: ka) the causes joined must belong to the same class
(b) they must not require separate places of trial and (c) forbids the
joining of equitable and legal causes.
The logical basis of the code classification is that the mixing of
unlike actions may be prejudicial either on procedural or substantive
problems. The possibility of prejudice arising from free joinder of
causes is a complaint which is often cited but seldom encountered.
Can adequate protection against prejudice be assured merely by
looking at the theories on which the respective causes are based? It
is the opinion of the writer that the pre-determination of classes is not
the solution to the danger apprehended, but adequate protection
against possible prejudice and hardship can be provided by giving the
court power to order separate trials of the causes originally joined.
The arbitrary system of joinder as provided for by our present code
has proved very difficult to apply and it is difficult to determine, even
at the present time what can be joined.16 However, Federal Rule 18
provides that:
(a) The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting
forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate
claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may
have against an opposing party There may be a like joinder of
claims when there are multiple parties if the requirements of Rules
19, 20 and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder of cross-
claims or third party claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14
respectively are satisfied.
This rule eliminates this lack of decisiveness, for where the parties
are the same there is no restriction whatever. Where the parties are
different, full freedom of joinder is permitted, subject to the rules as
to joinder of parties.- That means where the parties are different
any joinder is permitted in cases which arise out of the same trans-
action of occurrence and involve a common question of law or fact.
Therefore, Federal Rule 18 (a) permits the joinder of practically any-
thing, but Federal Rule 42 (b) which provides that "the court in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate
trial of any claim, cross-clann, counter-claims, third party claims or
"5 Supra, note 11. Professor Sunderland notes some of the absurd and mcon-
vement results which the code classification may produce.
"Hendncks Admr. v. Amrencan Exp. Co., 138 Ky. 704, 128 S.W 1089
(1910); Rural Credit Subscribers Association v. Jett, 205 Ky. 604, 266 S.W 240
(1924).
' FEDERAL RULES 19. 20 and 22 must be satisfied.
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issues", acts as a buffer to any possible misuse or abuse of the privilege
of unlimited joinder which may result in genuine hardship or prejudice.
By approaching the joinder of causes problem as one to be enter-
tamed at the trial stage, the necessity of encountering the question of
whether there has been a misjoinder is eliminated for a large per-
centage of cases never get beyond the pleading stage. If a case is
settled before trial, what difference does it make how many causes it
embraced or on what theories they were grounded? Hence, the
writer suggests that the joinder of actions problem be approached as a
trial and not a pleading problem and a provision similar to 42 (b) be
provided, whereby the court is given ample power to order a separate
trial of any claim, or of any separate issue, or of any number of
claims or issues.
The venue problem under the present code is raised in the pro-
,ision which states that the joined causes shall not require different
places of trial. This limitation has not presented a situation which
would be described as serious, but nevertheless there exists the possi-
bility that a conflict could arise, hence in revising the section some
disposition must be made of this clause. The court must be able to tell
if the venue or place of trial is properly chosen. Certain actions,
particularly those dealing with realty, are local, and must be tried at
the place where the subject matter of the suit is located. Others are
transitory, and may be tried wherever it is possible to obtain junsdic-
ton over the person of the defendant. Therefore, this requirement in
the code will remain so long as this distinction between the type of
action is maintained. As a result the venue rule has not been affected
by this provision in the code. One case'8 clearly recognized and dis-
cussed the provision in section 88 which permits a joinder of action
only when they may be brought in the same county The problem
arose in relation with civil code Section 78 which provides that -
"Actions against a common earner upon a contract to
carry property must be brought in the county where the defendent
resides, or where the contract is made, or where the property is to be
delivered, and actions for injuries to a passenger or other person must
be brought in county where defendant resides, or where plaintiff is
injured or resides, if he resides in a county through which the road
passes.
An action was brought against a common carrier for damages
growing out of the negligent shipment of household goods from a
point in Indiana to a point in Kentucky The plaintiff in the same
action asked for damages for personal injuries sustained by him in the
same collision in which his goods were damaged while the car was on
"Wilson v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 112 S,W 585 (1908).
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the side track in St. Louis,, Missouri. The action was brought in the
Madison County Circuit Court against the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad Company The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the
Madison County Circuit Court had jurisdiction as to the cause of
action for damages for injury to the household goods because the
action was instituted in the county where the carrier defendant agreed
to deliver the property as provided in the first part of section 73. But
the court further asserted that it did not have jurisdiction as to the
cause of action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff for by
the latter part of Section 73, no authority is given to bring an action
for an injury to a passenger in the county where the carrier agrees to
deliver the property On this account Section 83 does not remedy the
matter, for under that section one of the conditions precedent to
uniting several causes of action is that each may be brought in the
same county It is common knowledge that one of the primary ob-
jectives of the law is to avoid a multiplicity of actions,O and the court
stressed the desirability of permitting causes ansmg out of the same
transaction to be tried at the same time and place. 20 The provisions of
Federal Rule 18 for the ]oinder of claims are subject to Rule 82, that is,
jurisdiction and venue are not affected in any manner and the rules
must be construed in accordance with that principle. The writer sug-
gests that where the party is before the court for any portion of the
controversy he should be required to answer all joinable issues.
Since the term "cause of action" does not appear in the Federal
Rules because it denotes a concept which is difficult to define, Federal
Rule 18 is titled "joinder of Claims" It is doubtful that this title will
be adopted by our Legislature since the term "cause of action" has
deep roots in our law and has been extensively used in publications.2 1
An excellent illustration of the thoroughness with which the Fed-
eral Rules has handled the joinder problem is shown by noting Rule
54, which provides that:
"when more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the issues ma-
tenal to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim,
may enter a judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall
terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and
separate judgment is so entered, the court by order, may stay its en-
forcement until the entenng of a subsequent judgment or judgments
and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the bene-
fit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered."
" Gilliam v. Cassady, 290 Ky. 477, 161 S.W 2d 915 (1942).
- McCullen v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 146 N.C. 568, 60 S.E. 506 (1908).2 McCaskill, The Eluswzve Cause of Action, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281 (1937).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Therefore, where there is a suit based upon several causes of action
and the court or the parties find it convement to dispose of one of the
issues and postpone the remainder, the practice is allowed and the
procedure to be followed is clearly presented. Any subsequent doubt
as to whether the judgment is final or interlocutory is disposed of, for
the rule specifically gives the court discretion to so determine.
The Kentucky code provides that legal and equitable causes of
action may not be joined in one suit,2 2 but for the purposes of jomder
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the distinction between
legal and equitable claims has been abolished 23 and in the interest of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive determmation of every action a
plaintiff is permitted to join all legal and equitable claims which can
be conveniently disposed of in one trial.2
4
This provision seems to solve many of the difficulties which have
permanently established themselves within our procedure of con-
ducting causes of action based on legal and equitable principles, and
it is recommended that such action be taken by our legislature.
In cases involving a single plaintiff and single defendant under
the present joinder of causes code section when A sues B he may join
any number of causes for injury to person or property however unre-
lated they may be;2 or he may join any number of causes for breach
of contract.2" The classes are broad enough to permit considerable
freedom of joinder, but they are not broad enough to permit tort and
contract causes to be joined.27 Joinder has been permitted, however,
where the tort is waived and that cause grounded on a contract
theory 2" A recent decision handed down by our Court of Appeals
reiterated the principle that causes of action in tort and contract were
improperly joined.-"' The facts of the case were as follows: As a
result of a collision between their respective automobiles, the parties to
the suit made a settlement. The plaintiff, gave to the defendant his
promissory note for $109, the amount of damage to defendant's car,
which was later paid. The plaintiff brings this action and in his
petition joined an action for damages to his car - an action in tort -
with an action in contract based upon an alleged promise by de-
fendant to pay him $238, the amount of damage to his car. The plain-
Rural Credit Subscribers Assn. v. Jett 205 Ky. 604, 266 S.W 240 (1924).
28 U.S.C. 1946 "there shall be but one form of action to be known as
civil action"
"' Supra, note 8.
-. Justice v. Justice, 295 Ky. 610, 175 S.W 2d 21, (1943).
' Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Milford Bank, 236 Ky. 457, 33 S.W
2d 312 (1930).
' Willis v. Tomes 141 Ky. 431, 132 S.W 1043 (1911).
-'Roberts v. Moss, 127 Ky. 657, 106 S.W 297 (1907).
'Folden v. Shelton, 312 Ky. 74, 226 S.W 2d 531 (1950).
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tiff was required to elect which cause of action he would pursue, and
upon the election, he thereby, in effect, eliminated all of his petition
except that refernng to the alleged tort. By requiring this election the
controversy which was based upon similar facts was required to be
split thereby requiring separate suits. A similar situation arose in a
case30 before the Federal Court, where the complaint alleged that the
plaintiff purchased a ticket entitling her to passage on defendant's
vessel, and while she was a passenger on the vessel the defendant's
servants, without provocation, and in breach of the defendant's con-
tract to safely convey the plaintiff to her destination negligently, wil-
fully and illegally imprisoned her in the hospital ward. As a result the
plaintiff became mentally unbalanced and brings this action for
damages. The defendant's ground for a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint is directed to the fact that the plaintiff has attempted to state
a cause of action in both tort and contract. The court denied the
motion holding that a complaint is not defective merely because it
joins causes of action in tort and in contract. Therefore, under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a party may state as manv separate
claims as he has, and is not bound to select any particular theory upon
which to seek judgment.
A further possibility of controversy arises in determining whether
the joinder of the actions is to be permissive or mandatory Under our
present code it has been interpreted to mean permissive, " hence a
failure to join does not close the doors to possible future litigation upon
a different cause of action.32 But if the rule of joinder is mandatory
the prior action would act as a bar to any future litigation for a general
rule concerning res judicata is that not only the claims actually liti-
gated but also matters which might have been litigated are barred by
a judgment between the parties.33 Although our present code pro-
vision as to the joinder is stated in permissive language, if Federal Rule
18 (a) is adopted, it is deemed advisable by the writer to require that
a party should join all claims which arose out of the same transaction
that he has against the party in his complaint.
There has been a tendency of the States, since the adoption by the
Supreme Court of the Federal Rules, to liberally re-examine the entire
legal attitude toward the problem of joinder. The restricted joinder
of actions at common law was based largely upon historical practice
that resulted in an illogical and arbitrary system. This form of pro-
' Munzer v. Swedish Amencan Line, 30 Fed. Supp. 789 (1939).
"Clark v. Mason, 264 Ky. 683, 95 S.W 2d 292 (1934); Strubble v. Green,
934 Ky. 384, 28 S.W 2d 271 (1930).
I-bIlnd.
"Turner v. Deaton, 220 Ky. 154, 294 S.W 1063 (1927).
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cedure was changed but slightly by the adoption of the Code by the
various States. The writer takes the position that the savings of ex-
pense to litigants, the elimination in whole or in part of the congested
dockets of the courts, as well as the interest of the public, dictate a
wider joinder - if not entire freedom thereof.
WImm~Am M. DEEP
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICTi
What is done in a situation where a jury brings in a verdict for
one party when a verdict should have been directed in favor of the
other partv The most common answer is for the trial judge or the
appellate court to grant a new trial. But such a practice is very un-
satisfactory The party for whom the verdict should have been
directed in the first instance is subjected to a lengthy delay He is
burdened with the expenditure of time and effort in addition to the
cost of re-litigation of a case which will undoubtedly end in his favor
if he still has tab on his witnesses and their memories have not dulled
with the passage of time. Also, it is not unthinkable that the other
party may well have time enough for some unscrupulous lawyer to
manufacture new evidence to conform to the appellate court's opinion.
Under the present practice in Kentucky an error of the trial court
in overruling a motion for a directed verdict can only be corrected by
the trial court or the appellate court's granting of a new trial.2 The
only exception is that a judgment non obstante verdicto can be granted
by the appellate court upon the pleadings. Ordinarily, a directed
verdict is proper in a case where the proof is insufficient to disclose
any controversy as to the controlling facts of the case, or where
there is a lack of proof supporting one or more of the material fac-
tors of the cause of action propounded so that the case requires only
The Latin term for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, used mostly at
the common law, is non obstante veredicto. The literal translation of non obstante
is notwithstanding, and thus the modern name for the same motion is judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. It is also very common parlance with lawyers andjudges to use the initials n.o.v. for non obstante veredicto and the terms will be
us-ed interchangeably in this note.
'Weikel v. Alt, 234 Ky. 91, 27 S.W 2d 684 (1980); Baskett v. Coombs
Admr., 198 Ky. 17, 247 S.W 1118 (1928); Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Sorg,
180 Ky. 539, 203 S.W 300 (1918); L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 168 Ky. 851,
182 S.W 214, L. R. A. 1916D, 514 (1916); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore,
154 Kv. 18, 156 SAN 867 (1918); L. & N. Ry. v. Paynter s Admr., 26 Ky. L. Rep.
761, 82 S.WV 412 (1904); Mast. Crowell & Kirkpatrick v. Lehman, 100 Ky. 464,
:38 S.W 1056 (1897).
